Soviet Violations of the 1920 Treaty of Moscow and the Subjugation of Georgia

Introducton

The geopolitical relationship between Soviet Russia and the Democratic Republic of Georgia in the early 1920s was defined by a paradoxical interplay of diplomatic recognition and aggressive expansionism.

The Treaty of Moscow, signed on May 7, 1920, ostensibly guaranteed Georgian independence, with Article I explicitly stating that Russia “unconditionally recognizes the existence and independence of the Georgian state” and renounced all sovereign claims over its territory.

However, by 1921, Soviet Russia had already violated this agreement through military invasion, and subsequent actions in 1922–1923—including the suppression of Georgian autonomy and the consolidation of Soviet control—represented a systematic dismantling of the treaty’s provisions.

The breach of the treaty was driven by ideological imperatives, geopolitical strategy, and the centralized ambitions of Bolshevik leaders like Joseph Stalin and Grigol Ordzhonikidze.

Background

The coup d'état in Georgia in May 1920 constituted an unsuccessful endeavor by the Bolsheviks to seize power within the Democratic Republic of Georgia.

The Bolsheviks, relying on the 11th Red Army of Soviet Russia stationed in the neighboring region of Azerbaijan, made an attempt to gain control over a military academy and governmental offices in the Georgian capital, Tiflis.

However, their efforts were thwarted, thereby preventing the advance of Russian troops along the Azerbaijani-Georgian border.

The formidable Georgian resistance, coupled with an ongoing conflict with Poland, ultimately compelled the Bolshevik leadership to postpone the Treaty of Moscow.

The 1920 Treaty of Moscow: A Fragile Recognition

The Treaty of Moscow emerged from a precarious context. Following the Russian Civil War, Soviet Russia sought to stabilize its southern borders while undermining independent states that had emerged from the collapse of the Russian Empire.

For Georgia, the treaty was a diplomatic victory, securing recognition from a powerful neighbor.

Article IV delineated Georgia’s territorial boundaries, incorporating Tiflis, Kutais, Batum, and other regions. Critically, the treaty’s secret supplement obligated Georgia to legalize Bolshevik organizations and cease persecuting communist activists.

This clause created a legal framework for Soviet subversion, enabling Bolshevik factions to operate freely within Georgia’s borders.

Despite these concessions, the treaty’s viability was tenuous. Soviet leaders, including Stalin (then People’s Commissar for Nationalities), viewed Georgia as a strategic foothold in the Caucasus and a barrier against Western influence.

Lenin’s government, while publicly committed to national self-determination, increasingly prioritized ideological consolidation over diplomatic agreements.

The treaty’s prohibition on foreign military presence (Article V) left Georgia vulnerable, as it precluded international support against Soviet aggression.

The 1921 Red Army Invasion: Direct Violation of Sovereignty

The Soviet invasion of Georgia in February 1921 marked the treaty’s first major breach. Orchestrated by Stalin and Ordzhonikidze, the invasion was justified under the pretext of supporting a fabricated Bolshevik uprising in Lori and Shulaveri.

Red Army units, nominally responding to a request from the Georgian Revolutionary Committee (Revkom), swiftly overran Tbilisi and established a Soviet puppet government.

This act directly contravened Article I of the treaty, which had recognized Georgia’s independence just nine months earlier.

Lenin’s hesitation—rooted in concerns over international backlash and Kemalist Turkey’s simultaneous incursions into Georgian territory—was overridden by Stalin’s insistence on immediate action.

The invasion exemplified Soviet realpolitik: treaties were tactical instruments, subordinate to the broader goal of expanding communist influence.

By March 1921, Georgia had been forcibly incorporated into the Transcaucasian Socialist Federative Soviet Republic (TSFSR), a move vehemently opposed by Georgian Bolshevik moderates like Filipp Makharadze and Budu Mdivani.

The Georgian Affair and the Erosion of Autonomy (1922–1923)

The Georgian Affair of 1922–1923 encapsulated the escalating conflict between Georgian communists seeking limited autonomy and Moscow’s centralizing agenda.

The dispute centered on Georgia’s status within the Soviet Union: Stalin and Ordzhonikidze insisted on subsuming Georgia into the TSFSR, while Mdivani’s faction demanded direct republic status.

Lenin initially vacillated, criticizing Stalin’s “Great Russian chauvinism” but ultimately acquiescing to the TSFSR’s formation in December 1922.

The Politburo’s decision on January 25, 1923, to purge Mdivani and his allies marked a definitive victory for Stalin.

This political purge violated the spirit of the 1920 treaty, which had implied non-interference in Georgia’s internal governance.

The removal of moderate leaders dismantled Georgia’s residual autonomy, ensuring compliance with Moscow’s directives.

Lenin’s deteriorating health and subsequent death in 1924 further emboldened Stalin, who marginalized dissent within the Georgian Communist Party.

Ideological and Strategic Motivations for Treaty Violations

The Soviet violation of the Treaty of Moscow was driven by three interrelated factors:

Geopolitical Ambitions

The Caucasus represented a critical buffer zone against Turkey and Western powers. Control of Georgia’s Black Sea ports (e.g., Batumi) and oil-rich regions aligned with Soviet strategic interests. The 1923 Treaty of Lausanne, which revised Black Sea navigation rights, underscored the region’s enduring importance.

Ideological Hegemony

The Bolsheviks could not tolerate a Menshevik-led Georgia, which served as a ideological counterpoint to Soviet communism. The 1924 August Uprising, a large-scale revolt against Soviet rule, highlighted persistent resistance, prompting brutal repression led by Lavrentiy Beria.

Centralization of Power

Stalin’s rise necessitated the elimination of regional autonomy. The TSFSR’s creation streamlined control over the Caucasus, facilitating resource extraction and political consolidation.

Consequences and Legacy

The Soviet breach of the 1920 treaty had profound consequences. The 1924 August Uprising, which sought to restore Georgian independence, was crushed with mass executions and deportations, cementing Soviet domination.

Georgia’s forced integration into the USSR exemplified Moscow’s disregard for nominal sovereignty agreements, a pattern repeated in later conflicts such as the 2008 Russo-Georgian War.

The treaty’s violation also set a precedent for Soviet foreign policy, where diplomatic agreements were subordinate to ideological and strategic imperatives.

This approach reverberates in contemporary Russian actions, such as the 2008 recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, which similarly invoked “protection” rhetoric to justify intervention.

Conclusion

The Soviet Union’s abrogation of the 1920 Treaty of Moscow was not an isolated incident but a calculated step in the broader project of imperial reconstitution.

By 1923, through military force, political manipulation, and repression, Georgia’s nominal independence had been extinguished.

The treaty’s violation underscores the tension between Soviet rhetoric of self-determination and the realities of centralized control—a dynamic that continues to shape Russia’s interactions with its neighbors today.