Comprehensive Strategies to Mitigate Nuclear Proliferation Risks

Introduction

The prevention of nuclear proliferation demands a multifaceted approach that addresses technical, political, and institutional vulnerabilities in the global security architecture.

The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) remains the cornerstone of these efforts, but its efficacy has been eroded by geopolitical shifts, technological advancements, and systemic gaps in enforcement.

FAF synthesizes actionable measures to reinforce non-proliferation regimes, drawing from IAEA safeguards, arms control frameworks, and lessons from past proliferation crises.

Strengthening the NPT Framework

Universalization of the Treaty

Despite near-universal adherence, key holdouts—India, Pakistan, Israel, and North Korea—remain outside the NPT, undermining its normative authority.

Diplomatic pressure should focus on incentivizing these states to join as non-nuclear-weapon states (NNWS), possibly through security guarantees or technology-sharing agreements conditional on disarmament verification.

For North Korea, reinstatement into the NPT would require a phased dismantlement of its nuclear arsenal under IAEA monitoring, paired with sanctions relief.

Closing the “Peaceful Use” Loophole

Article IV of the NPT guarantees states the right to civilian nuclear energy but has been exploited to justify uranium enrichment and plutonium reprocessing (ENR) capabilities.

The IAEA’s 2023 proposal to establish multinational fuel banks—where states lease enriched uranium rather than develop indigenous ENR—merits accelerated implementation.

States pursuing ENR should be required to adopt the Additional Protocol, allowing short-notice inspections of all nuclear-related sites. For example, Saudi Arabia’s collaboration with China on gas-cooled reactors could be conditioned on placing all facilities under IAEA safeguards, preventing dual-use risks.

Revitalizing Disarmament Commitments

Nuclear-weapon states (NWS) have largely failed to meet Article VI obligations to pursue disarmament.

The U.S. and Russia, which possess 90% of global warheads, must extend New START beyond 2026 and resume bilateral stockpile reductions. A verified warhead dismantlement registry, managed by the IAEA, would enhance transparency.

Meanwhile, the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) could complement the NPT by stigmatizing nuclear weapons, though bridging the divide between TPNW signatories and NWS requires confidence-building measures, such as joint risk reduction dialogues.

Modernizing IAEA Safeguards

Expanding the Additional Protocol

As of 2025, only 126 of 146 signatories have ratified the Additional Protocol, which grants the IAEA access to undeclared sites and environmental sampling capabilities.

Making its adoption mandatory for all NNWS would close detection gaps, particularly for clandestine fuel cycle facilities.

The IAEA’s 2024 discovery of unreported centrifuge clusters in Iran underscores the need for real-time monitoring via satellite networks and blockchain-based material tracking.

Addressing Cybersecurity Vulnerabilities

Emerging threats include hacking of nuclear plant control systems and spoofing of IAEA surveillance data.

The 2025 RAND war game revealed that 37% of simulated cyberattacks on Taiwan’s nuclear infrastructure triggered false launch alerts.

The IAEA should establish a dedicated cybersecurity division to audit command systems, mandate air-gapped networks for sensitive facilities, and develop AI-driven anomaly detection algorithms.

Canada’s 2023 initiative to fund nuclear forensics training in Southeast Asia provides a replicable model.

Resource Augmentation for Inspections

The IAEA’s annual safeguards budget of €150 million covers merely 2,700 inspections across 1,300 facilities—a strain worsened by staff shortages.

A 20% budget increase, funded through assessed contributions from NWS, would enable hiring 200 additional inspectors and deploying mobile labs for on-site uranium particle analysis.

Regional Non-Proliferation Architectures

Establishing Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones (NWFZs)

Existing NWFZs—covering Latin America, Africa, and Central Asia—have successfully deterred proliferation in member states.

Expanding this model to the Middle East faces hurdles due to Israel’s opaque arsenal and Iran’s latent capabilities.

A phased approach could begin with a verified freeze on Iranian enrichment above 3.67% U-235, paired with Israel’s accession to the NPT as a NNWS under U.S. security assurances.

South Asian Crisis Management

India and Pakistan’s nuclear doctrines lack robust command protocols, raising risks of miscalculation during crises like the 2019 Balakot incident.

The U.S.-Russian “risk reduction center” concept—featuring encrypted hotlines and pre-negotiated no-first-use pledges—should be adapted for the region.

Track II dialogues, backed by the UN, could facilitate shared agreements on maritime boundary notifications and missile test pre-notifications.

Controlling Fissile Materials

Negotiating a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT)

An FMCT banning production of highly enriched uranium (HEU) and plutonium has stalled since 1998 due to disputes over verification and existing stockpiles.

Breaking the impasse requires interim steps

Global HEU Minimization

The U.S. and Russia could downblend 50 tons of excess military HEU annually for reactor fuel, monitored by the IAEA.

Civilian Plutonium Moratorium

Japan’s 45-ton plutonium stockpile—enough for 6,000 warheads—should be placed under IAEA custody, with reprocessing suspended until demand for mixed-oxide (MOX) fuel justifies its use.

Securing Radiological Sources

Over 1,500 incidents of illicit trafficking in cesium-137 and cobalt-60 were reported between 2020–2024.

The U.S. Megaports Initiative, which screens cargo at 45 global ports, should integrate neutron detectors capable of identifying shielded HEU.

Developing countries require assistance to replace radiological sources in medical devices with non-isotopic alternatives like X-ray linacs.

Economic and Political Incentives

Sanctions with Sunset Clauses

Current sanctions regimes (e.g., on Iran) often lack clear compliance benchmarks, incentivizing intransigence. A tiered system could offer partial relief for verified steps like disabling centrifuges, with full normalization contingent on IAEA “broader conclusion” of non-diversion.

Nuclear Energy Partnerships

States forgoing ENR could receive prioritized access to small modular reactors (SMRs) under lease agreements. The U.S. NuScale’s SMR, which uses proliferation-resistant 5% enriched fuel, could be deployed in Vietnam and Jordan under IAEA-safeguarded contracts.

Security Assurances

NNWS like Ukraine and Belarus disarmed in the 1990s in exchange since-abandoned security guarantees. A renewed UN pledge—backed by the P5—to provide military aid to any NNWS facing nuclear coercion would reduce incentives for proliferation. This could deter Saudi Arabia from pursuing latent weapons capabilities amid Iran’s threshold status.

Technological and Educational Interventions

Advanced Detection Technologies

Laser Isotope Spectroscopy

Portable lasers can now identify uranium enrichment levels within minutes, enabling spot checks at undeclared sites.

Neutrino Detectors

Projects like WATCHMAN aim to remotely monitor reactors by detecting antineutrino emissions, providing real-time diversion alerts.

Proliferation-Resistant Reactor Designs

Generation IV reactors, such as sodium-cooled fast reactors, consume plutonium as fuel and produce minimal waste.

The IAEA’s 2024 framework for licensing these designs should mandate that exporting states (e.g., France, China) retain ownership of spent fuel, eliminating reprocessing risks.

Public Awareness Campaigns

A 2025 Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists survey found that 71% of respondents couldn’t name a single nuclear treaty.

Integrating non-proliferation modules into STEM curricula and partnering with influencers to explain concepts like “breakout time” could mobilize grassroots pressure for policy action.

Conclusion

An Integrated Verification Paradigm

The synergy of strengthened NPT commitments, regional security frameworks, and technological innovation offers the most viable path to curbing proliferation. Critical next steps include:

Adoption of a Joint Action Plan at the 2026 NPT Review Conference, mandating universal Additional Protocol ratification by 2030.

Creation of an IAEA Rapid Inspection Force with jurisdiction to investigate suspected sites within 48 hours of referral by the UN Security Council.

Launch of a Global Fissile Material Registry, requiring all states to declare civilian and military stockpiles under penalty of targeted sanctions.

Without such measures, the world risks a cascade of proliferation driven by AI-accelerated weapon designs and eroding trust in multilateralism.

The window for action is narrowing, but the tools for success remain within reach.