Benefits and risk of IMAC over Silk route
Introduction
Bin Salman, commonly referred to as MBS, reportedly at least once referenced the assassination of Egyptian president Anwar Sadat, who was shot dead by Islamist terrorists in 1981, two years after he signed a peace agreement with Israel. MBS asked his interlocutors what the US had done to protect Sadat after the landmark peace deal.
The crown prince was said to have cited the risk of assassination in explaining why any normalization deal between Riyadh and Jerusalem must include a “true path to a Palestinian state,” something the current Israeli government publicly opposes.
Facts
The assassination of Egyptian President Anwar Sadat in 1981 is not directly linked to the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC), which was announced in 2023. However, there are historical parallels and lessons that can be drawn between Sadat’s assassination and the potential risks faced by leaders involved in initiatives like IMEC, particularly in the context of regional geopolitics and normalization with Israel.
Key Reasons for Sadat’s Assassination
Sadat was assassinated by members of the Egyptian Islamic Jihad due to his peace treaty with Israel, signed as part of the Camp David Accords in 1978. This treaty was deeply unpopular among many in the Arab and Islamic world, who viewed it as a betrayal of the Palestinian cause. Sadat’s decision to make peace with Israel led to Egypt being ostracized from the Arab League and triggered widespread opposition from Islamist groups within Egypt, culminating in his assassination during a military parade on October 6, 1981.
Potential Parallels with IMEC
While IMEC is a modern initiative aimed at improving economic connectivity between India, the Middle East, and Europe, it also involves sensitive geopolitical dynamics, particularly around Saudi Arabia’s potential normalization with Israel. Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (MBS) has shown interest in normalizing relations with Israel as part of broader economic and diplomatic initiatives like IMEC. However, just as Sadat faced intense opposition for his peace deal with Israel, MBS could face similar backlash from Islamist groups or factions within Saudi Arabia who oppose any formal ties with Israel.
Key Parallels and Risks
1. Normalization with Israel: Like Sadat’s peace treaty with Israel, Saudi Arabia’s potential normalization with Israel under IMEC could provoke strong opposition from Islamist groups or hardliners within the kingdom. This could pose security risks to MBS, similar to those faced by Sadat.
2. Geopolitical Backlash: Sadat’s assassination was partly fueled by regional hostility toward Egypt’s alignment with Western powers and Israel. Similarly, MBS’s involvement in IMEC—which is backed by the U.S., India, and European nations—could be seen as aligning Saudi Arabia too closely with Western interests, potentially making him a target for extremist groups or regional rivals like Iran.
3. Domestic Opposition: Just as Sadat faced domestic unrest due to his policies, MBS could encounter internal dissent if segments of Saudi society view normalization with Israel or participation in a Western-led economic corridor as compromising Saudi or Islamic values.
4. Cost saving
Based on research, we can calculate the annual savings from using the IMAC shipping route instead of the Silk Route.
• The Silk Route costs approximately $400 per shipment.
• The IMAC route is estimated to be 25% cheaper than the Silk Route.
Conclusion
Although there is no direct correlation between the assassination of Anwar Sadat and the International Middle East Peace Conference (IMEC), the historical context surrounding Sadat's assassination underscores the potential risks that leaders, such as Mohammed bin Salman (MBS), may encounter when engaging in contentious geopolitical initiatives, such as normalization with Israel. The opposition Sadat faced due to his peace efforts serves as a cautionary example for today's leaders as they navigate similarly delicate diplomatic landscapes.
