Syria’s Fragmented Political Landscape: Sectarian Tensions, Foreign Interventions, and Territorial Disputes
Introduction
The political situation in Syria has undergone dramatic transformation following the December 2024 overthrow of Bashar al-Assad’s regime, ending nearly 25 years of his leadership and over five decades of Ba’ath Party rule.
This seismic shift has reshaped Syria’s internal dynamics and regional relationships, creating a complex web of sectarian tensions, foreign interventions, and territorial disputes.
This report examines the current state of Syria’s political landscape, focusing on the interim government’s challenges, sectarian dynamics, and the roles of external actors, particularly Israel’s expanding occupation and regional tensions involving Turkey and other powers.
The Post-Assad Transitional Government
Since December 2024, Syria has been governed by a caretaker administration led by Ahmed al-Sharaa, named Syria’s interim president on January 29, 2025.
Sharaa, formerly associated with Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), a group designated as terrorist by the UN Security Council, has been attempting to establish legitimacy while facing enormous challenges in unifying a fragmented country.
Efforts Toward Political Transition
The transitional authorities have announced steps toward a political process that would eventually lead to elections in four to five years.
On February 12, 2025, Sharaa announced the establishment of the Preparatory Committee for the National Dialogue Conference, composed of five men and two women from diverse backgrounds, including law, governance, civil society, and political science.
This committee conducted consultations across various Syrian provinces, culminating in the National Dialogue Conference on February 25. The conference produced a statement laying the groundwork for a new constitution.
Despite these efforts, the transition faces significant obstacles. The security landscape remains highly fragmented, with numerous armed groups maintaining various levels of autonomy.
UN Special Envoy Geir Pedersen has warned that the situation in northeastern Syria is “extremely concerning” with “daily front-line hostilities impacting civilians.”
According to the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, more than 627 people have been killed in Syria, including 56 civilians, since December 12, 2024.
Military Integration Challenges
Integrating various armed factions into a unified national military is a critical challenge for the transitional government.
On February 18, 2025, the commander of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) Northern Brigade announced an agreement to integrate their forces into the Syrian government’s army.
However, subsequent statements from the SDF did not confirm this announcement, suggesting ongoing disagreements over the integration process, particularly regarding foreign fighters linked with the Kurdistan Workers Party, which Turkey considers a terrorist organization.
The interim government has also faced resistance from former regime loyalists. On March 6, 2025, gunmen aligned with the ousted Assad regime killed at least 15 security personnel during ambushes in the coastal region of Latakia, a significant area for the Alawite minority to which the Assad family belongs.
Following these attacks, a commander from the former regime announced the establishment of a resistance faction called the “coastal shield regiment” to oppose the new government. To Latakia, the central government responded by dispatching military reinforcements from various provinces, including Hama, Homs, and Idlib.
Sectarian Dynamics and Minority Relations
Syria’s complex sectarian landscape has become increasingly tense following the regime change, with various ethnic and religious communities navigating their relationships with the new authorities.
The Druze Community and Southern Syria
The Druze community, concentrated in Suwayda Province, has been negotiating its position with the new government. Recently, prominent Druze militias, including the Men of Dignity Movement, agreed to establish Druze-led security forces under interim Syrian government control in Suwayda Province.
This agreement represents a significant shift from the movement’s previous stance of preventing government forces from entering Suwayda.
The agreement stipulates that local leaders and residents from Suwayda would comprise the province’s security units, although details regarding the composition of these units remain unclear. This development comes amid rising tensions in southern Syria, particularly following Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s demand to “demilitarize” the region.
On February 24, 2025, a delegation of Druze officials, including Ahrar al Arab Gathering leader Sheikh Suleiman Abdul Baqi and former Men of Dignity member Laith al Balous, met with Sharaa in Damascus to discuss security cooperation in southern Syria.
This meeting reflects the interim government’s efforts to cultivate goodwill among the Druze community rather than forcibly deploying security forces to Suwayda Province.
Tensions have also emerged in Jaramana, a densely populated suburb near Damascus with a majority Druze and Christian population, where militia groups refusing to disarm have caused security unrest.
In response, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Defense Minister Israel Katz instructed the Israeli military to prepare to “protect” the area, which they referred to as “Druze.” This move has been viewed as an escalation against Syria’s new administration.
Lebanese Druze leader Walid Jumblatt has criticized Israel’s approach, accusing “Zionists” of using Druze soldiers and officers to repress Palestinians while seeking to expand into Jabal al-Arab in the Suwayda governorate, the Druze stronghold in Syria. Jumblatt announced plans to visit Damascus to reaffirm Syria’s role as a reference point for the Druze community.
Alawite Community and Emerging Insurgency
The Alawite community, which formed the backbone of Assad’s regime, has been particularly affected by the transition. The coastal region of Latakia, an Alawite stronghold, has become a focal point for resistance against the new government.
The March 6 attacks by Assad loyalists in Latakia represent “one of the most substantial security challenges confronted by the new government since the fall of the Assad regime three months ago,” according to Al Jazeera correspondent Resul Serdar.
More broadly, small-scale insurgent cells have started to emerge and attack Syrian interim government forces in some regions of Syria. Former Assad regime members are likely to form the most effective insurgent cells, given their pre-established networks.
These “hardcore Assadists” are expected to exploit various grievances against the Syrian interim government to recruit new members who may not initially be motivated by a desire to restore Assad.
Israel’s Expanding Occupation and Military Operations
Israel has significantly expanded its presence in Syria following Assad’s fall, taking advantage of the power vacuum to seize territory and conduct extensive military operations.
Occupation of the Buffer Zone
On December 8, 2024, Israel invaded the buffer zone in southwestern Syria adjacent to the Israeli-occupied Golan Heights. Israel declared the 1974 border agreement with Syria to be void and, despite initially claiming the invasion would be “temporary,” later stated it would hold onto the territory for an “unlimited time.”
By January 9, 2025, Israeli officials announced plans to occupy for “the long run” a 15 km “zone of control” and 60 km “sphere of influence” deeper into Syria.
The Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) have established at least nine army posts in Syria, including two on Mount Hermon and seven in the buffer zone. This occupation violates the 1974 Disengagement of Forces Agreement between Israel and Syria.
On February 25, 2025, the IDF completed raids in southern Rif Dimashq, in the villages of Al-Kiswa and Daraa, in the vicinity of the city of Izra. The raids penetrated the outskirts of Al-Bakar village and the administrative borders between the governorates of Daraa and Quneitra in southern Syria. Israel has also taken the villages of Sidon Al-Golan and Sidon Al-Hanout in the countryside of Quneitra.
Military Strikes and Demilitarization Demands
Israel has conducted extensive airstrikes against Syrian military targets across the country under an operation codenamed “Operation Arrow of Bashan.”
According to Israeli claims, these strikes destroyed between 70% and 80% of Syria’s strategic weapons, including 15 naval vessels. A senior Israeli security source described it as the “largest air operation carried out by its air force in its history.”
The airstrikes have continued into 2025. On March 3, 2025, Israeli fighter jets carried out strikes against Assad-era weapons depots, aiming to prevent Syria’s new government from utilizing weapons left over from the deposed regime.
On February 25, 2025, Israel conducted a wave of airstrikes in Damascus and southern Syria, one day after demanding that the Syrian transitional government demilitarize Quneitra, Daraa, and Suwayda.
On February 23, 2025, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu demanded the complete demilitarization of southern Syria in the provinces of Quneitra, Daraa, and Suwayda and the withdrawal of Syrian forces from Syrian territory south of Damascus.
Israeli Defense Minister Israel Katz stated that Israeli forces would remain in southern Syria “for an indefinite period to protect our communities and thwart any threat.”
Syrian Response to Israeli Actions
Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa has criticized Israel’s actions but has also indicated that Syria is not in a position to engage in a new conflict. On March 5, 2025, Sharaa stated that “the Israeli aggression is an exploitation of the regime’s collapse. (Israel) justifies its aggression for alleged security concerns, but it reflects expansionist intentions”. When asked how Syria would respond, Sharma replied, “This is something we should not disclose now.”
Sharaa has also declared that Syria remains committed to the 1974 agreement and does not want any conflict with Israel or any other country.
He has stated that Syria will not allow its territory to be used to attack other countries, such as Israel. Syria’s UN ambassador Qusay al-Dahhak has called on the UN Security Council to compel Israel to immediately cease its attacks and withdraw to the Purple Line (ceasefire line).
Israeli Strategic Objectives
According to a Wall Street Journal report on March 5, 2025, Israel has targeted military sites in southern Syria to prevent weapons from falling into the hands of the new government. It has also gone after “Türkiye-backed groups” trying to unite the country divided by sectarian and ethnic lines.
FAF reviews that Tel Aviv is lobbying world powers to keep the central government in Damascus weak and is promoting the idea that Syria should be a federal state with autonomous ethnic regions, with the southern border areas demilitarized by Israel.
Israel has also announced plans to allocate “more than $1 billion” in support of the Druze in northern Israel, which security analysts believe is a strategy to persuade the Druze to reject the new Syrian government.
Some Syrian community leaders have expressed concern about Israel’s expansionist ambitions, reporting that Israel has de facto control of Quneitra, one of three Syrian provinces that border Israel.
Regional and International Dynamics
The situation in Syria continues to be influenced by various regional and international actors, each pursuing their interests and agendas.
Turkey’s Role and Concerns
Turkey has been supporting certain groups in Syria, notably the Turkish-backed Syrian National Army (SNA), which has been engaged in clashes with the US-backed SDF in northeastern Syria. These clashes continue to impact civilians, with UN Special Envoy Pedersen expressing concern about the situation.
Turkey’s primary concern in Syria appears to be containing Kurdish influence, particularly groups linked to the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), which it considers a terrorist organization.
The ongoing negotiations between the Syrian interim government and the SDF regarding the integration of Kurdish forces into the national army are likely influenced by Turkish pressure to ensure the departure of foreign fighters linked to the PKK.
According to the Wall Street Journal report, Israel views “Türkiye-backed groups” aiming to unify Syria as a threat. This suggests potential tensions between Israeli and Turkish interests in Syria, with Turkey supporting efforts to maintain Syria’s territorial integrity while Israel appears to favor a more fragmented approach.
Russia’s Continuing Influence
Despite the fall of its ally Assad, Russia continues to maintain a significant presence in Syria and is seeking to preserve its influence. On February 12, 2025, Russian President Vladimir Putin reportedly held a phone call with Sharaa, indicating Moscow’s efforts to engage with the new caretaker authorities.
Russia is likely seeking to retain its air base in Hmeimim and naval base in Tartous, which provide it with strategic access to the Mediterranean. According to media reports, Syria’s central bank received a consignment of Syrian currency from Russia on February 14, 2025, suggesting ongoing economic support.
The Syrian interim government has established some degree of economic cooperation with Russia amid negotiations over Russian basing rights in Syria. Russian oil exports to Syria have continued, and Syrian officials have recently expressed interest in developing economic ties with Russia.
United States and International Community
The United States and Israel conducted a joint air exercise on March 4, 2025, to strengthen interoperability and prepare for “a range of scenarios.” The US maintains a presence in Syria, primarily supporting the SDF in northeastern Syria.
The international community’s approach to the Syrian transition remains cautious. While the authorities in Damascus are acknowledged to have sent positive messages on various issues, including governance, many countries are likely to evaluate their stance and support based on the authorities’ concrete actions and implementation of commitments in the months ahead.
Several European powers have shown willingness to engage with the interim leadership. French President Emmanuel Macron has reportedly invited Sharaa to visit Paris. Syrian Foreign Minister Asaad al-Shaibani received an invitation to Brussels from the EU’s High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and Vice President Kaja Kallas.
These invitations suggest that key European powers may see an opportunity to enhance their relationship with Syria following the reduction of Iranian and Russian influence.
Houthi Connection and Regional Tensions
While not directly involved in Syria, the Houthi movement in Yemen has been designated as a foreign terrorist organization by the United States, which has also sanctioned eight Houthi officials for facilitating attacks on international shipping and for recruiting Yemenis to fight for Russia in Ukraine.
This development highlights the complex web of regional alliances and conflicts indirectly affecting the Syrian situation.
Russia has reportedly provided intelligence for attacks on international shipping and attempted to recruit Yemenis to fight in Ukraine. The US Treasury has stated that Russia and China colluded with the Houthis to ensure that Houthi forces would not attack Russian and Chinese-flagged vessels in the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden.
This collaboration demonstrates how Russia seeks to undermine US interests in the Middle East while supporting Iranian-backed groups like the Houthis.
Conclusion
Syria’s Uncertain Future
Syria’s political landscape remains highly volatile and fragmented following the fall of the Assad regime. The interim government led by Ahmed al-Sharaa faces enormous challenges in unifying the country, integrating various armed factions, addressing sectarian tensions, and responding to foreign interventions, particularly Israel’s expanding occupation of Syrian territory.
The situation is further confused by the emergence of insurgent cells loyal to the former regime, ongoing clashes between Turkish-backed and Kurdish forces, and the strategic interests of regional and global powers such as Russia, Turkey, and the United States.
Israel’s aggressive actions in southern Syria, including its occupation of the buffer zone and demands for demilitarization, pose a significant threat to Syria’s territorial integrity and sovereignty.
As Syria navigates this complex transition, the international community’s approach will be crucial in determining whether the country can achieve stability and rebuild after years of conflict.
The success of the interim government’s efforts to establish inclusive governance, address sectarian concerns, and resist foreign interference will shape Syria’s future trajectory in the coming months and years.
