How Not to End the War in Ukraine Past Failures Make Clear That an Imposed Peace Won’t Last

Introduction

How Not to End the War in Ukraine: Lessons from Failed Peace Processes and the Perils of Imposed Solutions

History

The quest to end Russia’s war against Ukraine has produced numerous proposals, ranging from ceasefire agreements to long-term security frameworks.

Yet historical precedents and current geopolitical realities reveal a consistent pattern: peace processes that prioritize expediency over justice, concessions over sovereignty, or short-term pauses over structural security guarantees are destined to fail.

The Minsk agreements of 2014–2015, the 2022 Istanbul Communiqué, and parallels with other frozen conflicts such as the Israeli-Palestinian stalemate demonstrate that imposed solutions lacking Ukrainian agency and enforceable mechanisms only embolden Russian aggression.

This analysis synthesizes lessons from past failures to outline why a durable peace requires rejecting territorial concessions, ensuring NATO integration, and upholding international law.

The Minsk Agreements: A Blueprint for Failure

Absolving the Aggressor and Normalizing Occupation

The Minsk II agreement, signed in February 2015 under intense Russian military pressure, established a framework that treated Russia not as a belligerent but as a mediator in a conflict it had instigated. By framing the war as an “internal Ukrainian crisis” and omitting obligations for Russia to withdraw its forces, the deal legitimized Moscow’s narrative of denial.

Russian proxies in Donetsk and Luhansk—entirely dependent on Kremlin funding and military support—were granted political leverage over Ukraine’s constitutional reforms.

This fatal flaw allowed Russia to weaponize the agreement, demanding Ukraine grant autonomy to occupied territories while ignoring its own commitments to cease hostilities.

The absence of enforcement mechanisms further crippled Minsk II. The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), tasked with monitoring ceasefire violations, lacked authority to intervene against Russian obstructions.

Russian forces routinely blocked OSCE access to conflict zones, rendering the mission ineffective. Meanwhile, Moscow exploited the Normandy Format (Russia, Ukraine, Germany, France) to cast Ukraine as a “spoiler of peace” whenever Kyiv resisted political capitulation. The result was a diplomatic farce: Russia continued arming separatists, escalating violence, and violating human rights while blaming Ukraine for the collapse of negotiations.

The Trap of Sequencing and Political Coercion

Minsk II’s requirement that Ukraine implement constitutional reforms before regaining control of its border with Russia created an untenable asymmetry.

Kyiv was expected to decentralize power and hold elections in occupied territories under duress, with Russian troops and proxies still present.

This sequencing guaranteed that any vote would occur under coercion, as seen in Russia’s sham referendums in 2022. Ukrainian efforts to amend the agreement—such as proposing UN peacekeepers to secure the border—were dismissed by Moscow, which viewed Minsk not as a path to peace but as a tool to destabilize Ukraine’s sovereignty.

The lesson is clear: agreements that demand unilateral concessions from the victimized party while absolving the aggressor of accountability are fundamentally unjust. As former Ukrainian negotiator Oleksandr Chalyi noted, “Russia’s goal was never to resolve the conflict but to keep Ukraine in a perpetual state of vulnerability”.

The Istanbul Communiqué and the Illusion of Neutrality

The 2022 Draft Treaty: Capitulation Disguised as Compromise

In March 2022, as Russian forces advanced on Kyiv, negotiations in Turkey produced a draft agreement that would have forced Ukraine into neutrality, slashed its military to 50,000 troops, and recognized Russian claims to Crimea and Donbas.

While framed as a “compromise,” the terms mirrored Putin’s maximalist aims: Ukraine’s disarmament, geopolitical isolation, and acceptance of territorial dismemberment.

The proposal also included clauses demanding the eradication of Ukrainian cultural and linguistic identity, echoing Soviet-era Russification policies.

Ukrainian negotiators initially considered these terms under existential duress. However, the revelation of Russian atrocities in Bucha and Irpin hardened Kyiv’s resolve, leading to the collapse of talks. The draft treaty’s failure underscores a critical reality: neutrality imposed through coercion cannot guarantee security. Ukraine’s pre-2014 non-aligned status did not prevent Russia’s annexation of Crimea or invasion of Donbas.

As Foreign Minister Dmytro Kuleba argued, “Neutrality is a trap that leaves us defenseless against future aggression”.

The Perils of “Freezing” the Conflict

Recent proposals, such as the 2024 Trump-Kellogg plan, advocate freezing the conflict along current frontlines while deferring territorial disputes to future diplomacy.

This approach mirrors the Minsk playbook, rewarding Russian territorial gains and ignoring Ukraine’s right to self-defense.

By postponing NATO membership and conditioning military aid on ceasefire compliance, such plans leave Ukraine vulnerable to renewed attacks once Russia replenishes its forces.

Historical parallels further discredit this strategy. The 1949 Lausanne Conference on Palestine, which sought to resolve territorial disputes after Israel’s independence, failed because it prioritized power imbalances over Palestinian rights.

Similarly, the 1993 Oslo Accords collapsed when Israel expanded settlements despite Palestinian concessions. In both cases, delaying core issues exacerbated tensions rather than resolving them.

Lessons from the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict: The Futility of Imposed Solutions

The Oslo Accords and the “Peace Process” Mirage

The Israeli-Palestinian peace process, dominated by U.S.-led negotiations, repeatedly prioritized Israeli security demands over Palestinian self-determination.

The 2000 Camp David Summit, for instance, offered Palestinians fragmented cantons under Israeli control while denying refugee rights and sovereignty over East Jerusalem. By sidelining international law and UN resolutions, these talks normalized occupation and fueled radicalization.

A similar dynamic threatens Ukraine. Proposals that condition peace on Ukrainian territorial concessions or neutrality echo the “Bantustan model” imposed on Palestinians, where nominal autonomy masks subjugation.

As Palestinian scholar Edward Said observed, “Peace processes that ignore justice become tools of perpetual domination”.

The Balance of Power Fallacy

U.S. mediators in both conflicts often assumed that stronger parties (Israel, Russia) could dictate terms.

This approach, rooted in realpolitik, ignores how asymmetrical agreements breed resentment and instability. In Ukraine, demands for “neutrality” disregard Kyiv’s agency and the will of its people, 85% of whom support NATO membership. Likewise, Palestinian rejection of unequal deals reflects a refusal to surrender fundamental rights for temporary calm.

The Path to Durable Peace: Rejecting Failed Models

NATO Membership as a Non-Negotiable Guarantee

Ukraine’s integration into NATO remains the most effective deterrent against future Russian aggression. The alliance’s Article 5 collective defense clause would neutralize Moscow’s ability to exploit frozen conflicts, as seen in Moldova’s Transnistria region.

Critics argue that NATO expansion provokes Russia, but this conflates cause and effect: Putin’s invasions of Georgia (2008) and Ukraine (2014) occurred before NATO offered Membership Action Plans to either country.

The West German precedent is instructive. Despite Soviet objections, West Germany’s 1955 NATO accession stabilized Europe by embedding a defeated aggressor (Germany) within a rules-based framework. Similarly, Ukrainian membership would signal that post-war security architectures reject territorial conquest.

Justice, Reparations, and Accountability

No lasting peace can exist without addressing war crimes and reparations. The International Criminal Court’s indictments of Putin and Russian commanders establish a legal basis for accountability.

Additionally, reparations—funded by seized Russian sovereign assets—should finance Ukraine’s reconstruction, as proposed by the EU’s Ukraine Facility.

Dismantling Russia’s Imperial Delusions

Putin’s insistence on Ukraine’s “denazification” and “demilitarization” masks a deeper objective: the erasure of Ukrainian identity. Peace plans must explicitly reject these genocidal tropes and affirm Ukraine’s right to self-determination.

The 2024 UN General Assembly Resolution ES-11/1, which condemns Russia’s attempted annexations, provides a legal foundation for this stance.

Conclusion: The High Cost of False Peace

History offers no examples of imposed peace lasting where the aggressor retains conquered land and the victim is disarmed. The Minsk agreements, the Istanbul Communiqué, and the Oslo Accords all failed because they substituted justice with expediency. For Ukraine, any formula requiring neutrality, territorial concessions, or delayed NATO accession would replicate these errors, inviting further Russian aggression.

A durable settlement must instead

Restore Ukraine’s territorial integrity within internationally recognized borders.

Accelerate NATO membership to provide enforceable security guarantees.

Hold Russia accountable through tribunals and reparations.

Integrate Ukraine into the EU to anchor democratic reforms and economic recovery.

As British Prime Minister Keir Starmer noted at the 2025 UN Security Council, “Putin only wants capitulation.

True peace requires Ukraine’s victory”.

The alternative—a flawed ceasefire that ignores these principles—would not end the war but merely pause it, at catastrophic human and geopolitical cost.