Sabotage in Baltic Sea to benefit Russia and China?

Introduction

The presence of the Danish Navy monitoring a suspicious Chinese vessel off its coast presents a significant geopolitical challenge. Here are the details.

Incident in Baltic sea

On November 12, the Chinese-flagged bulk carrier Yi Peng 3 arrived at Russia’s Baltic Sea port of Ust-Luga. Three days later, it departed from the port. Shortly thereafter, the first cable was severed, followed by a second cable.

On the morning of November 19, the Yi Peng 3 was navigating away from the Baltic Sea toward the Atlantic Ocean. By the afternoon, it was nearing the Danish Straits. However, this time, NATO member naval forces were prepared to intercept the suspicious Chinese vessel. As early evening approached and the ship neared Denmark’s Great Belt strait, it became evident that it was under surveillance by the Royal Danish Navy, which is also responsible for coastguard operations.

Vessels from the Swedish Navy and Coast Guard were also present on the Swedish side of the strait.

Later that evening, the Yi Peng 3 appeared to be exiting Danish waters, heading north toward Sweden and Norway. As of noon today, the bulk carrier remained in the same position, located between the Danish and Swedish coasts in the southern part of the Kattegat Strait. To reach the Atlantic, the vessel must still navigate through the remainder of the Kattegat. At the time of this report, the reason for its halt remains unclear.

Therefore Danish Navy has detained the Chinese bulk carrier Yi Peng 3, which is suspected of damaging telecommunications cables in the Baltic Sea.

The detention took place in the area of Danish territorial waters, in the Danish Straits at the exit of the Great Belt. The detention of the vessel was carried out by the Danish Navy patrol vessel P525. After a few hours, another vessel HDMS Soeloeven, which is specialised for underwater work, reached both vessels. The detention of the vessel occurred on the evening of 19 November. There is no information on whether there was an inspection of the vessel by the Danish MW’s boarding group.

The Sabotage pointing to China.

Cutting undersea cables in the Baltic Sea, which connect Sweden, Lithuania, Finland, and Central Europe, could benefit countries like Russia and China in several strategic, geopolitical, and economic ways:

Disruption of Western Communication and Economy

Critical Infrastructure:

These cables carry vast amounts of internet, financial, and military data. Cutting them would disrupt communication, trade, and coordination within Europe, weakening its ability to respond to crises effectively.

Economic Chaos:

Disruption to financial markets, businesses, and government operations would result in economic losses, creating instability that adversaries could exploit.

Geopolitical Leverage

Testing NATO’s Response:

Attacking critical infrastructure could test NATO’s collective defense response without directly targeting a member state’s military, exploiting ambiguities in Article 5.

Undermining European Unity:

The Baltic States and Nordic countries are critical members of the European and NATO alliance. Disrupting their connectivity with Central Europe would create tension and stress within these alliances.

Military Advantages

Disrupting Defense Coordination: NATO’s defense relies heavily on real-time data and secure communication. Cutting these cables would hinder military coordination, giving adversaries like Russia a tactical advantage.

Targeting Baltic Defense Strategy:

The Baltic Sea region is a critical area for NATO’s deterrence against Russia. Communication disruption could hamper regional defense efforts, making it easier for Russia to exert influence.

Cyber and Information Warfare

Creating Vulnerabilities:

Damaging undersea cables would force rerouting of internet traffic, potentially exposing data to interception and surveillance by adversaries.

Misinformation Opportunities:

The confusion and chaos from such an attack could be exploited through propaganda campaigns, spreading false narratives, and blaming other actors.

Strategic Gains for China

Weakening Western Alliances:

As an indirect beneficiary, China benefits when NATO and the EU are distracted and weakened, as it reduces Western focus on Indo-Pacific issues.

Economic Opportunity:

Disruptions in European digital infrastructure could open doors for Chinese technology companies to promote alternatives or exploit the chaos for their gain.

Energy and Trade Disruption

Control Over Critical Resources:

Disrupting these cables could also interfere with energy grid communications, as the Baltic region is critical for energy transfers and trade. This would exacerbate Europe’s energy challenges, particularly in winter.

Weakening Competitors:

An economically and politically destabilized Europe is less able to counterbalance Russia or China on the global stage.

Signaling and Psychological Impact

Demonstrating Capability:

Sabotaging undersea cables would show the technological and operational reach of an adversary, serving as a warning to the West.

Undermining Public Confidence:

Such actions would erode trust in the security of infrastructure, further destabilizing governments and alliances.

Conclusion

By targeting such cables, Russia and China could exploit vulnerabilities in European infrastructure, undermine NATO cohesion, and distract Western powers from broader geopolitical issues, such as the war in Ukraine or the Indo-Pacific rivalry.